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INTRODUCTION

There may not be a more mysterious term in Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence than “purpose.” In this context, purpose is generically
defined as the reason or reasons an officer took certain action. 1 It is
understandable that courts would elect to focus heavily on an officer’s
purpose. If we wish to deter bad actors and promote an egalitarian
administration of justice, an officer’s motivation for acting should be
critically important to an analysis of the constitutionality of that officer’s
action. Yet, the United States Supreme Court has consistently held that the
subjective purpose of a police officer is irrelevant under the Fourth
Amendment, outside of the special needs or administrative inspection
context. 2 This potential paradox is perhaps most puzzling in the context of
whether an officer has conducted an unconstitutional search in the curtilage
of one’s home.
This article focuses on the meaning of the term “purpose,” and its
relationship to searches conducted within the curtilage of one’s home under
the Fourth Amendment. The analysis primarily focuses on three curtilage
cases: one of which is a state case and the others are federal cases. 3 There is
a relative dearth of literature discussing purpose under the Fourth
Amendment. The existing literature typically advocates for the Court to
narrowly consider, or even rely upon, a government actor’s subjective

See, e.g., Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 10 (2013); Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398,
404–5 (2006); Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 811–13 (1996); Horton v. California,
496 U.S. 128, 138 (1990); Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989); Scott v. United
States, 436 U.S. 128, 138 (1978).
See Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 740 (2011); Whren, 517 U.S. at 806; Horton, 496
U.S. at 138.
This article will analyze Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1 (2013); State v. Chute, 908 N.W.2d
578 (Minn. 2018); and then Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146 (2004).
1

2

3
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motivation for taking certain actions. 4 In contrast, this article does not dwell
on the merits of whether considerations of a subjective purpose are
preferable from a policy perspective.
Instead, it first broadly argues that the Supreme Court is consistent
when it maintains that an officer’s subjective purpose for acting is irrelevant
under the Fourth Amendment. The United States Supreme Court follows
precedent and does not rely on, or even consider, an officer’s subjective
purpose for acting. 5 Objective evidence alone is used to determine an
officer’s ostensible purpose. 6 Therefore, the objective reasonableness of an
officer’s actions is critical. Courts often appear to rely on an officer’s
subjective purpose with its use of certain language. Nonetheless, that use
simply creates a linguistic illusion of subjectivity. Objective evidence is key.
Although the consideration of an officer’s subjective purpose would reduce
the number of reprehensible government actors, objective evidence was—
and appears to remain—the only evidence vital to the constitutionality of an
officer’s actions. 7 Ultimately, an officer’s subjective intent is irrelevant. 8
This argument leads to an additional, narrower one: purpose is
innately subjective. Only the individual actor actually knows why he or she
took action. The enunciation of an objective purpose is troubling. Reaching
such a conclusion requires the analysis of objective evidence to determine
an actor’s ostensible purpose. A court can say what an actor’s objectively
determined purpose was. Yet, it cannot definitively say that it was the actor’s
actual purpose. In fact, if the Court did determine the actor’s actual purpose,
such a determination is constitutionally irrelevant. 9 At the very least, courts
currently use language that causes confusion and blurs the line between
objective and subjective purposes in their analyses.
Therefore, the Court is inconsistent to the extent it created an “area”
prong and a “purpose” prong for testing whether an unconstitutional search
occurred in the curtilage of one’s home. 10 The area where the officer
conducted the investigation is useful for determining whether the officer’s
actions were objectively reasonable and consequently constitutional. 11 This
area, however, is not dispositive as to the constitutionality of the officer’s
See Craig M. Bradley, The Reasonable Policeman: Police Intent in Criminal Procedure,
76 MISS. L. J. 339, 343 (2006); John M. Burkoff, Bad Faith Searches, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 70,
111 (1982).
See Ashcroft, 563 U.S. at 740; Whren, 517 U.S. at 806; Horton, 496 U.S. at 138.
See Ashcroft, 563 U.S. at 740; Whren, 517 U.S. at 806; Horton, 496 U.S. at 138.
See Ashcroft, 563 U.S. at 740; Whren, 517 U.S. at 806; Horton, 496 U.S. at 138.
See Ashcroft, 563 U.S. at 740; Whren, 517 U.S. at 806; Horton, 496 U.S. at 138.
See Ashcroft, 563 U.S. at 740; Whren, 517 U.S. at 806; Horton, 496 U.S. at 138.
Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 9 (2013).
Id. at 10.
4

5
6
7
8
9

10
11
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actions. 12 The consideration of all objective evidence, including the area
where the officer went, provides an answer to the critical question: whether
the officer’s intrusion relates to a lawful reason for entering a home’s
curtilage. The purpose prong, in particular, creates issues due to the innate,
subjective nature of purpose. Therefore, if the Court desires to make an
officer’s subjective purpose truly irrelevant, the two-prong test should be
abolished and all references to an individual’s purpose should cease. It is
superfluous and confusing if the objective reasonableness of the officer’s
actions is critical. A test of objective reasonableness that analyzes whether
the officer’s intrusion relates to a lawful reason for entering the curtilage is
more manageable, mitigates potential uncertainty, and, in essence, is already
in place.
II. PURPOSE, CURTILAGE, AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
Curtilage, the area “immediately surrounding and associated with the
home . . . warrants the Fourth Amendment protections that attach to the
home.” 13 Whether a given area is considered curtilage is determined by a
host of factors peripheral to the arguments posited in this article. 14 In Florida
v. Jardines, Detective Pedraja of the Miami-Dade Police Department was
the recipient of an “unverified tip” that Jardines was growing marijuana in
his home. 15 Approximately one month later, the Department and the Drug
Enforcement Administration dispatched a “joint surveillance team” to
Jardines’ home. 16 Detective Pedraja was a member of that team. 17 There
were no vehicles in Jardines’ driveway, and the ability to see inside Jardines’
home was nonexistent because the blinds were drawn. 18
Detective Pedraja watched the home for fifteen minutes prior to the
arrival of Detective Bartlet, a “trained canine handler,” accompanied by the
detective’s detection dog. 19 The two detectives immediately proceeded to
approach the home. 20 As the detectives and the dog neared the front porch
of Jardines’ home, the dog “apparently sensed one of the odors he had been
trained to detect, and began energetically exploring the area for the strongest

12

Id.

13

Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984).

14

See United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294 (1987).
Jardines, 569 U.S. at 3.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 3–4.
Id. at 3.

15
16
17
18
19
20
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point source of that odor.” 21 The dog traveled “back and forth, back and
forth” across the breadth of the porch in an attempt to locate the source of
the odor. 22 Eventually, the dog sniffed the front door of Jardines’ home and
sat down, which is “trained behavior” when the source of the odor is
discovered. 23 Detective Bartlet informed Detective Pedraja there had been
a “positive alert for narcotics.” 24 With this knowledge in hand, Detective
Pedraja took leave and obtained a search warrant. 25 The warrant was
executed later that day, and its execution revealed marijuana plants. 26
Jardines was arrested and charged with drug trafficking. 27
Jardines subsequently moved to suppress the evidence on the basis that
the search was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. 28 While the
trial court agreed, the Florida Third District Court of Appeals reversed. 29
However, the Florida Supreme Court reversed the appellate court,
approving the trial court’s decision to suppress the evidence. 30 The Florida
Supreme Court reasoned that using the detection dog to investigate
Jardines’ porch was a search under the Fourth Amendment unsupported
by probable cause. 31 Therefore, the warrant was invalidated, as information
obtained from that illegal search was foundational to the warrant. 32 The
Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari, “limited to the
question of whether the officers’ behavior was a search within the meaning
of the Fourth Amendment.” 33
The Court ultimately held the behavior was a search, relying on an
approach that tacitly focused on the officers’ actions and their lack of
relationship to the lawful conducting of a knock-and-talk. 34 The Court also
recognized that the public, including police officers, have a “traditional
invitation,” that is, an implicit license to approach a “home by the front path,
knock promptly, wait briefly to be received, and then (absent invitation to
linger longer) leave.” 35 As enunciated in Jardines, the scope of that license is
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35

Id. at 4.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 4–5.
Id. at 5.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 12.
Id. at 8.
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limited to a “particular area” and a “specific purpose.” 36 The majority was
perturbed by the introduction of a detection dog to the curtilage of Jardines’
home. 37 Police officers, devoid of a warrant, may approach the front door
of a home and knock on the door but may “do no more than any private
citizen might do.” 38 Prevailing social norms do not invite visitors to search
the area upon arrival. 39
The State argued that Supreme Court precedent establishes that the
subjective motivation of a police officer is constitutionally irrelevant under
the Fourth Amendment. 40 The Court was quick to contextualize that
assertion, stressing precedent merely establishes that an “objectively
reasonable” search will not be deemed unconstitutional simply because a
police officer’s “real reason” for conducting a search is distinct from the
“validating reason” for conducting the search. 41 The Court provided the
example of a black man who is pulled over for not wearing a seatbelt will
have no recourse simply because the police officer’s subjective purpose for
pulling the man over was the officer’s malice towards African-Americans. 42
If the black man did fail to wear his seatbelt, that fact validates the officer’s
decision to pull the man over regardless of the actual reason for which he
was pulled over. 43 Ultimately, the Court stressed that the precise question
before it was whether “the officer’s conduct was an objectively reasonable
search.” 44
A reasonable interpretation of the Court’s detailed opinion makes it
seem as if the Court failed to abide by its own precedent. It also—whether,
implicitly or not—made the officers’ subjective purpose relevant when
determining the constitutionality of the officers’ actions. 45 For instance, the
Court specifically enunciated that there is no “customary invitation” to
introduce “a trained police dog to explore the area around the home in
hopes of discovering incriminating evidence.” 46 However, hopefulness
relates to an individual’s feelings and perhaps, emotional state. That feeling
is unique to the individual alone. The individual is the only person capable
of experiencing that exact feeling at that exact moment. Although people
36
37

Id. at 9.
Id.

38

Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 469 (2011).

39

Jardines, 569 U.S. at 9.
Id. at 10.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See generally id.
Id. at 9.

40
41
42
43
44
45
46
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can debate how an objectively reasonable person would feel in any given
situation, the only person who actually knows how they felt, or why they
acted, is the individual who experienced the feeling or acted in a certain way.
If the officer hoped to discover such evidence, that seems to be a subjective
consideration that contradicts the Court’s precedent. 47 At the very least, the
Court’s language has the tendency to confuse.
The foregoing is not the only language in Jardines that appears to create
inconsistency and confusion. The fine line between an objective purpose
and a subjective purpose is difficult to distinguish throughout the opinion.
The Court stressed the “officers learned what they learned only by
physically intruding on Jardines’ property to gather evidence.” 48 Once again,
the Court, by specifically referencing that the officers entered Jardines’
curtilage to “gather evidence,” makes it appear that the officers’ subjective
motivation was vital to the Court’s inquiry. 49 Such reference by the Court
allows for the reasonable interpretation that it claims the subjective
motivation of the officers was “to gather evidence.” 50 If true, and such
motivation was in fact relied on, the Court failed to follow precedent. It was
unnecessary for the Court to say that the officers entered Jardines’ curtilage
to complete such a task. This language tends to cause more confusion than
clarity. Eventually, the Court held that the officers’ actions, including the use
of the detection dog, constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment. 51
The Court reasoned that the officers’ behavior “objectively reveals a
purpose to conduct a search, which is not what anyone would think they
had a license to do.” 52 This statement should be interpreted as an assertion
that the officers’ actions did not relate to a lawful purpose that allowed the
officers to enter Jardines’ curtilage, that is, to conduct a lawful knock-andtalk.
Justice Alito’s dissent provides further insight into the confusion
caused by the majority’s choice of language. 53 Ultimately, Justice Alito takes
a purely textual approach and argues the officers’ actions were nonintrusive
and reasonable. 54 Although his conclusion is not necessarily correct, Justice
Alito’s approach is valuable as it forcefully disregards any consideration of
the officers’ subjective purpose. Justice Alito clearly relies on objective
evidence to conclude that the officers’ actions, including introducing the
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54

Id.
Id. at 11.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 10.
Id. at 16–26.
Id. at 23–25.
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detection dog to Jardines’ porch, simply were not violative of the Fourth
Amendment. 55 Those actions did not exceed the scope of the implied
license. 56 While this conclusion cuts at the heart of the protections afforded
by the Fourth Amendment, the simplicity and precision of Justice Alito’s
reasoning deserves attention.
Initially, Justice Alito argues the majority’s reliance on trespass
principles is misguided and has no basis in Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence. 57 Specifically, Justice Alito is perplexed that the majority
believed Detective Bartlett “committed a trespass because he was
accompanied during his otherwise lawful visit to the front door . . . by his
dog.” 58 Dogs have a magnificent sense of smell, and as such, have been relied
on by law enforcement officers for centuries in Anglo-American society. 59
The officer and his dog approached Jardines’ home via “the route that
any visitor would customarily use,” specifically over “the driveway and a
paved path.” 60 The entire process of walking up the driveway and path to
the front door, followed by the dog alerting, and concluded by walking back
to the street “took approximately a minute or two.” 61 After the strongest
source of the odor was located on Jardines’ porch, the officer and the dog
“immediately returned to their patrol car.” 62 Cumulatively, Justice Alito’s
arguments support the same conclusion: the officer did not exceed the
scope of the implied license to approach a home. 63 This license assuredly
has “certain spatial and temporal limits.” 64 People, including police officers,
may not, for example, loiter at the front door, approach the front door in
the middle-of-the-night without permission, or “traipse through the garden,
meander into the backyard, or take other circuitous detours.” 65
With these limitations in mind, Justice Alito shuns the notion that the
officer’s subjective purpose for conducting an otherwise valid knock-andtalk can make that knock-and-talk constitutionally impermissible. 66 Even
when the purpose of such a knock-and-talk is “to obtain evidence . . . the

55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66

Id. at 26.
Id. at 22.
Id. at 16.
Id.
Id. at 16–17.
Id. at 17.
Id. at 18.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 19.
Id. at 19–20.
Id. at 21.
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license to approach still applies.” 67 Regardless, then, of the officer’s
subjective purpose, “gathering evidence . . . is a lawful activity that falls within
the scope of the license to approach.” 68 While this is disagreeable as a matter
of policy, Justice Alito appropriately and affirmatively pronounces that he is
in no way relying on the officer’s subjective purpose. 69
Justice Alito finishes his discussion by highlighting the majority’s
peculiar choice of language with regard to purpose. 70 What the majority
meant by its conclusion that the officers’ actions objectively revealed a
purpose to conduct a search puzzled Justice Alito. 71 What that means, he
takes it, is that anyone with knowledge of the officer’s actions “would infer
that his subjective purpose was to gather evidence.” 72 In other words, the
objective facts available in the record allowed the fact-finder to make an
artificial determination as to the government actor’s subjective purpose for
acting. One could argue that if the former argument is true, the Court is
inappropriately relying on the subjective motivations of the actor, regardless
of whether that purpose is artificially determined using objective evidence.
Justice Alito’s argument appears meritorious on its face; however, it
fails to take into account the fact that the majority’s purpose determination
was completed by solely using the objective facts available. The term
“purpose” creates perplexities that tend to mislead, yet the officer’s
ostensible purpose was still determined objectively. In reality, the objective
facts show the officer’s actions were unrelated to a lawful purpose that would
allow the officer to enter Jardines’ curtilage to conduct a knock-and-talk.
The majority’s purpose determination provided the answer as to whether
the officer’s actions were reasonable, no matter how the result of such
analysis was phrased. 73 Justice Alito also stressed that police officers, more
often than not, primarily approach homes in order to gather evidence. 74 If
an officer’s subjective purpose were relied on, most knock-and-talks would
be constitutionally impermissible. However, the introduction of a trained
detective dog across the breadth of Jardines’ porch does not in any way
relate to conducting a permissible knock-and-talk.
If the dog accompanied the officer everywhere throughout his shift and
simply sat at the front door upon reaching Jardines’ porch, perhaps the
Court’s conclusion would have been different. Such action would arguably
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74

Id.
Id.
Id. at 22.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 9–10.
Id. at 21.
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relate to a lawful purpose for entering one’s curtilage, specifically a simple
knock-and-talk. However, it is always unreasonable for a detection dog to
accompany a police officer when intruding into the curtilage. Among their
functions of patrolling, searching, and pursuing suspects, detection dogs
have one principle purpose: to detect narcotics and other contraband. 75 The
implied license does not grant an officer a license to search the curtilage of
a home in the absence of a warrant. Justice Alito essentially made an
argument that, in contrast to the majority’s conclusion, the officer’s actions
did in fact relate to a lawful purpose that allows an officer to enter one’s
curtilage. Although his reasoning was phrased solely in terms of
reasonability—that is, that the officer did not exceed the scope of the implied
license to approach—Justice Alito relied on the path taken, the amount of
time present on the porch, and the time of day to stress the officer acted
constitutionally. 76 While Justice Alito’s lack of concern for individual privacy
is apparent, he did shed light on linguistic issues within the majority
opinion. 77
However, there is light at the end of the tunnel. When discussing a
concept as abstract as purpose, it is difficult to ensure that the entirety of an
opinion lacks confusing phrases. Notwithstanding any potentially perplexing
language, a detailed reading of Justice Scalia’s majority opinion alleviates any
concern that the Court relied on the officer’s subjective purpose. As a result,
the majority’s reasoning was consistent with precedent. It simply failed to
articulate its conclusions in the most coherent fashion. Although it is
arguable the majority failed to clearly rely on an objectively determined
purpose, in reality, the officer’s subjective purpose was disregarded. The
majority determined it was objectively unreasonable, and by extension, an
unconstitutional search, to allow a police dog, with its acute sense of smell
and thorough training, to repeatedly canvas the breadth of a home’s porch. 78
Such action did not reasonably relate to a lawful reason that allows an officer

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE LAW ENFORCEMENT
CORRECTIONS STANDARDS AND TESTING PROGRAM, GUIDE FOR THE SELECTION OF
DRUG DETECTORS FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT APPLICATION, NIJ GUIDE 601-00, 20–22
(2000); see also KENNETH FURTON, ET AL., THE SCIENTIFIC WORKING GROUP ON DOG
AND ORTHOGONAL DETECTOR GUIDELINES (SWGDOG), NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF
JUSTICE REPORT, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 134-139 (2010); Rebecca Schreiber,
Implementation of a K9 Unit, FLA. CRIM. JUST. EXECUTIVE INST., FLA. DEP’T OF L.
ENFORCEMENT,
https://www.fdle.state.fl.us/FCJEI/Programs/SLP/Documents/FullText/Schreiber.aspx [https://perma.cc/CS5F-PJ9R].
Jardines, 569 U.S. at 22.
75

AND

76
77
78

See id.
Id. at 9.
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to enter one’s curtilage and specifically, conduct a knock-and-talk. 79 There
is a stark difference between the generic home visitor and a “canine forensic
investigation.” 80 Although the former may often be unwelcome, it is, at least,
expected. In contrast, no reasonable person would expect, or find it
reasonable to allow, a police officer to introduce a trained police canine to
explore the breadth of his or her home’s curtilage.
The same reasoning applies regardless of the occupation of the
individual entering the curtilage. Suppose an individual entered the curtilage
of one’s home with a metal detector and began canvassing the curtilage. One
could speculate as to that individual’s subjective purpose for taking such
action, yet such speculation is irrelevant. The individual’s subjective purpose
for intruding within the curtilage could be to steal property or to find a longlost familial artifact. Neither purpose changes the fact that such action is
objectively unreasonable, since such intrusion does not relate to a lawful
purpose for entering one’s curtilage. In contrast, it would be lawful for an
individual to approach the home’s front door, knock, wait briefly to be
received, and ask for permission to use the metal detector in the
homeowner’s curtilage. Ultimately, permission is required to roam around
in someone’s yard in an attempt to discover items. Similar to the officer
being accompanied by his trained canine, bringing a metal detector onto an
individual’s property without consent creates the reasonable impression that
the individual is not there for permissible reasons. Therefore, regardless of
the person’s subjective purpose, such action would lead a reasonable
homeowner to “well, call the police.” 81
III. MINNESOTA’S HIGH COURT THROWS ITS HAT IN THE RING
In State v. Chute, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that an officer
conducted an objectively unreasonable search that violated the
Respondent’s Fourth Amendment rights. 82 The Court reasoned the officer’s
actions exceeded the scope of permissible knock-and-talk procedure. 83 The
facts of Chute present a unique opportunity to analyze a state court’s
handling of a curtilage issue and its accompanying purpose inquiry. The
Minnesota Supreme Court appropriately determined that the officer’s
actions were unreasonable in the absence of a warrant. 84 How the Court
reached its decision, however, deserves substantial attention in light of the
79
80
81

Id.
Id.
Id.

82

State v. Chute, 908 N.W.2d 578, 580 (Minn. 2018).

83

Id.
Id.

84
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Jardines decision and the Supreme Court’s purpose enunciations more
generally.
In Chute, an individual residing in a metropolitan suburb discovered
that his pop-up tent camper had vanished, and he subsequently reported
the apparent theft to the local police. 85 Several months later, the individual
was out for a drive on a county road and noticed what appeared to be his
camper nestled in defendant Chute’s backyard. 86 After this discovery, the
individual turned around and drove back in the opposite direction to “verify
that it was his stolen camper.” 87 The individual stated he was able to verify
the camper was his own because of the distinctive characteristics of the
camper. 88 After making this verification, the individual informed the police. 89
The layout of Chute’s property deserves attention. Trees border the
property’s west side, an obscuring fence flanks its east side, and a wetland is
situated at its southern point. 90 Chute’s home faces north and is located on
the county road. 91 The property has two driveways. 92 One of the driveways,
located on the west side of the property, is short, paved, and leads to a
detached garage. 93 An additional garage is located southwest of Chute’s
home towards the rear of the property. 94 The other driveway meanders
along the property’s east side, is accessible from the county road, is unpaved,
and loops around into Chute’s backyard. 95 The district court found that the
eastside driveway is “well-worn” and functions as a “turnaround or circle.” 96
The camper was situated in the southeast corner of the property near the
end of the unpaved driveway. 97
Shortly after receiving the tip, an officer was dispatched to the scene. 98
From the end of the eastside driveway, while still on the county road, the
officer “verified” the camper’s features mirrored the description stated in
the police report created at the time of the alleged theft. 99 After making this
verification, the officer entered his squad car and drove approximately
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99

Id. at 581.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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halfway down the eastside driveway. 100 At this point, the officer was about
200 feet from the county road. 101 The officer proceeded to exit his squad car
and walk to the camper. 102 After arriving at the camper the officer realized
the camper’s vehicle identification number (VIN) and license plate were no
longer present. 103 Determined not to leave empty-handed, the officer called
the camper’s manufacturer who informed him that a partial VIN was
stamped on the frame of the camper. 104 The officer located this partial VIN
and determined the partial number was consistent with the VIN of the
stolen camper. 105 The officer then proceeded to enter the camper and
discovered a personal item that belonged to the owner of the camper. 106
Upon verifying that the camper had been stolen, the officer intended
to “make contact with the homeowner.” 107 The officer “heard voices”
emanating from the garage in the southwest corner of the home and decided
he should attempt to make contact there. 108 The officer knocked at the
garage and was greeted by Chute. 109 The officer requested and was granted
permission to search the garage. 110 The officer subsequently discovered a
host of personal property that belonged to the same individual who owned
the camper. 111 After making this discovery, the officer requested permission
to search Chute’s home. 112 Consent was granted and more property
belonging to the camper’s owner was found in Chute’s home. 113
Chute was charged with felony possession of stolen property, and he
subsequently moved to suppress “all evidence found by police pursuant to
a warrantless search” of his property. 114 The district court denied Chute’s
motion, concluding the officer was authorized to seize the camper because
it was located on the eastside driveway, which was “impliedly open to the
public to access [Chute’s] home.” 115 Therefore, the officer “had a lawful right

100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 582.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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of access to the camper.” 116 Chute was ultimately convicted at trial. 117
However, the district court did not make an explicit finding that the eastside
driveway was within the curtilage of Chute’s home. 118
The state court of appeals reversed, stressing the officer did not have a
“lawful right of access to the camper” located within the curtilage of Chute’s
home. 119 Under Minnesota law, “police with legitimate business may enter
areas within the curtilage of the home if those areas are impliedly open to
the public.” 120 The legitimacy of an entry into one’s curtilage is determined
by analyzing the “scope of the implied license” as articulated in Florida v.
Jardines. 121 Whether the scope of the implied license was exceeded, this
article argues, is properly determined only by analyzing whether the officer’s
actions related to a lawful purpose that would allow him to enter one’s
curtilage. The court of appeals concluded the scope of the implied license
was transcended, as the officer’s entry into the curtilage was conducted with
“the purpose to conduct a search.” 122 Further, the unlawful search of Chute’s
curtilage tainted the subsequent search of Chute’s home. 123
The state filed a petition for review arguing the court of appeals erred
by concluding the search of the camper was unlawful. 124 The Minnesota
Supreme Court’s first task was to consider whether the officer conducted a
“trespassory search of Chute’s home when he entered the property to
examine the camper.” 125 To do so, the Court had to determine whether the
camper was located within the curtilage of Chute’s home. 126 If the camper
was located within the curtilage, the officer is constrained by the Fourth
Amendment. 127 In contrast, if the camper was not located in the curtilage, it
would be considered to be in “open fields,” and the Fourth Amendment
would not govern the officer’s actions. 128
By using the phrase “to examine the camper,” the Court placed itself
in danger of creating an analytical bind before it even began to explain its
conclusions. 129 Similar to the Supreme Court in Jardines, the Minnesota
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
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Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.; see also State v. Chute, 887 N.W.2d 834, 843 (Minn. Ct. App. 2016).
Chute, 887 N.W.2d at 841 (citing State v. Crea, 233 N.W.2d 736, 739 (Minn. 1975)).
Id. (citing Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 6–11 (2013)).
Chute, 908 N.W.2d at 582 (citing Chute, 887 N.W.2d at 842).
Chute, 887 N.W.2d at 843–44.
Chute, 908 N.W.2d at 582.
Id. at 583.
Id.
Id. at 583–84.
Id. at 584.
Id. at 583.
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Supreme Court was also at times careless with its language. For instance, it
was misleading for the Minnesota Supreme Court to end the foregoing
sentence with a consideration of whether the officer entered Chute’s
property “to examine the camper.” 130 Whether the officer’s actions related
to the lawful conducting of a knock-and-talk was key, regardless of why the
officer subjectively entered Chute’s property. Particularly, the location of
the camper, and by extension, where the officer went on Chute’s property,
was paramount. These considerations of location should be used to evaluate
whether the officer’s actions related to a lawful purpose for entering Chute’s
property.
The state understood the significance of location by arguing the
camper was located too far away from Chute’s home to be protected by the
Fourth Amendment. 131 In other words, it was objectively unreasonable to
believe the camper was contained within the curtilage of Chute’s home. 132
Therefore, the Fourth Amendment did not constrain the officer’s actions
regardless of his subjective purpose. 133 Ultimately, after applying the Dunn
factors, the Court concluded Chute’s backyard and the eastern, unpaved
driveway were within the curtilage of Chute’s home. 134 As a result, Chute was
afforded Fourth Amendment protections for his camper. 135
The Court’s second task was to determine whether the officer had an
implied license to enter onto the curtilage. 136 Whether a landowner has
granted another a license to enter onto his curtilage is a question of fact. 137
The district court concluded that since an obvious, shabby pathway existed
and two vehicles were parked near the camper, Chute had granted the
public an implied license to access his curtilage to seek a backyard entrance
to his home and garage. 138 The Minnesota Supreme Court determined that
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See id. at 585.
Id.
Id. at 584 (listing “four relevant factors to determine whether a disputed area falls within

the curtilage: ‘[1] the proximity of the area claimed to be curtilage to the home, [2] whether
the area is included within an enclosure surrounding the home, [3] the nature of the uses to
which the area is put, and [4] the steps taken by the resident to protect the area from
observation by people passing by’”) (quoting United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 301
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since the record supported the district court’s conclusion, that conclusion
was not clearly erroneous. 139
The Court’s final task was to determine whether the officer exceeded
the scope of the implied license. 140 To do so, the Court relied on the test
enunciated in Jardines, taking pains to assert that, “we must determine the
officer’s purpose, objectively, for entering the curtilage.” 141 Although the
preceding phrase is misleading to the extent a true purpose can be
objectively determined, the Court appropriately relied on available objective
facts to determine the officer’s ostensible purpose. 142 That purpose,
determined via an analysis of the officer’s location and his actions, showed
the officer’s intrusion into the curtilage did not relate to conducting a knockand-talk, which is the lawful purpose allowing an officer to enter one’s
curtilage. 143 Specifically, the location of the camper required the officer to
“deviate substantially” from the path that would take him to the back of
Chute’s home or garage. 144 This, in conjunction with the officer’s rigorous,
lengthy inspection of the outside and inside of the camper, led the Court to
conclude that the officer exceeded the scope of the implicit license to
approach a home and conduct a knock-and-talk. 145 Hence, the Court’s
decision should have been a straightforward one when based on these two
persuasive pieces of objective evidence.
Unfortunately, the Court once again placed itself in linguistic limbo by
stating: “the evidence demonstrates that the officer’s purpose for entering
the curtilage was to conduct a search.” 146 However, the reason that an officer
actually entered the curtilage, whether to conduct a permissible knock-andtalk or to conduct an illegal search, is constitutionally irrelevant or, at least,
it should be according to Supreme Court precedent. 147 The relationship
between the officer’s intrusion and lawful purposes for entering the curtilage
is crucial. Similar to Jardines, the record here also objectively demonstrates
that the officer’s intrusion was exceedingly unrelated to conducting a
permissible knock-and-talk. 148 Fortunately, there is no subjective evidence in
Id.; see State v. Jenkins, 782 N.W.2d 211, 223 (Minn. 2010) (stating that the Court reviews
district court factual findings for clear error).
Chute, 908 N.W.2d at 586.
Id.; see also Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 10 (2013).
Chute, 908 N.W.2d at 586–87.
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the record that demonstrates, or even lends credence to, the notion that the
officer entered Chute’s property for the purpose of conducting a search. 149
In other words, there is no statement or other evidence offered by the officer
that demonstrates the officer subjectively entered the curtilage to conduct a
search. This fact makes it easier to conclude that—although this Court’s
choice of language occasionally has a subjective bent—the Court objectively
determined that the officer took action unrelated to a lawful reason allowing
the officer to enter Chute’s property, rendering the officer’s action
unconstitutional. 150
Assuming such subjective evidence did exist, it would have been
constitutionally impermissible to consider it when determining whether the
officer exceeded the scope of the implied license to conduct a knock-andtalk. Appropriately, the officer’s ostensible purpose was determined
objectively. These purpose determinations, however, cause more confusion
than clarity. Nonetheless, the home and its surrounding areas should be
entitled to the most stringent of privacy protections. The officer’s actions
did not relate to a lawful purpose for entering the curtilage, and therefore,
those actions were objectively unreasonable. 151 The Minnesota Supreme
Court precisely followed United States Supreme Court precedent. 152
Although it occasionally composed an illogical phrase when enunciating its
conclusions, the Minnesota Supreme Court correctly determined the
officer’s actions were constitutionally impermissible. 153
IV. THE SUPREME COURT WANTS ANOTHER SHOT AT THE TITLE
In Collins v. Virginia, decided within three months of Chute, the U.S.
Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether “the automobile
exception of the Fourth Amendment permits a police officer, uninvited and
without a warrant, to enter the curtilage of a home in order to search a
vehicle parked therein.” 154 In that case, an orange and black-colored
motorcycle had been observed committing several traffic infractions. 155 One
investigating police officer visited the defendant’s Facebook page, where he
found pictures displaying the motorcycle in question at the top of the

149
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Id. at 587; see also Garza v. State, 632 N.W.2d 633, 639 (Minn. 2001); State v. Crea, 346,
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defendant’s driveway. 156 The officer was then able to discover the location of
the home in the Facebook pictures; he drove to the home and remained
parked on the street. 157 From there, the officer noticed what appeared to be
the motorcycle located in the same position on the driveway as in the
pictures underneath a tarp. 158 The officer then intruded upon the property,
approached the motorcycle, removed the tarp, and determined that the
motorcycle looked identical to the one that had previously eluded him. 159
After running the motorcycle’s license plate and VIN, the officer confirmed
the motorcycle had in fact been stolen. 160 The defendant was arrested for
receiving stolen property after admitting the motorcycle had been
purchased absent a title. 161 The trial court subsequently denied the
defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the warrantless
search of the motorcycle. 162 Although the courts’ reasoning differed, both
the Court of Appeals of Virginia and the Supreme Court of Virginia
affirmed the lower court’s decision. 163
The U.S. Supreme Court was tasked with determining whether the
automobile exception justifies a physical intrusion into the curtilage of one’s
home. 164 The answer to this question is “no.” 165 Unfortunately, the Court
again struggled to paint its analysis of the constitutionality of the officer’s
actions with the appropriate stroke of objectivity. 166 In other words, the Court
appeared to consider the officer’s subjective purpose while analyzing the
constitutionality of the officer’s actions. 167 The Court went out of its way to
reference that the officer’s stated purpose in removing the tarp from the
motorcycle was “to investigate further.” 168 Therefore, the officer’s subjective
purpose was actually “to investigate further.” 169 Why the Court felt it
necessary to include this quote is paradoxical in light of its precedent. It is
irrelevant whether the officer did in fact remove the tarp “to investigate
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further.” 170 Although such a statement makes it easy to conclude that the
officer entered the defendant’s property for unlawful reasons, the statement
is also inherently subjective. If one goes for a run to feel better, his or her
subjective purpose for running is to feel better. If analyzed in a vacuum, the
inclusion of this statement was inconsistent with precedent. Fortunately,
however, it was extraneous and had no effect on the Court’s conclusions.
The Court’s apparent reliance on the officer’s statement is not the only
example where the majority seemed to improperly consider, or at least
attempted to discern, the officer’s subjective purpose in its opinion. Relying
on Jardines, the Court stressed “[w]hen a law enforcement officer physically
intrudes on the curtilage to gather evidence, a search within the meaning of
the Fourth Amendment has occurred.” 171 Again, the inclusion of the phrase
“to gather evidence” implies the officer’s subjective purpose for entering the
curtilage was considered and helped lead the Court to conclude that the
officer’s conduct was constitutionally impermissible. 172 Yet, as will be shown,
it was irrelevant why the officer actually entered the curtilage, and the Court
understood this.
It would be a devastating blow to the protections afforded by the
Fourth Amendment to allow an officer “to rely on the automobile exception
to gain entry into a house or its curtilage for the purpose of conducting a
vehicle search.” 173 While the Court’s determination is not necessarily correct
in that the officer’s actions were unconstitutional, that statement is again
misleading. A true purpose cannot be determined objectively. The inclusion
of such language, therefore, has a strong tendency to make the Court seem
as if it is failing to follow its own precedent by relying on an officer’s
subjective motivation. 174 This statement implies that if the officer said he
entered a house or curtilage for the purpose of having a cup of tea—or at
least not to conduct a search—the officer’s actions are likely permissible. Yet,
whether the officer’s actions were objectively related to a lawful purpose for
entering the curtilage is controlling. 175 This is true regardless of whether the
officer subjectively acted for the purpose of conducting a search.

See, e.g., Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 153 (2004); Whren v. United States, 517
U.S. 806, 813 (1996); Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 138 (1990); Arizona v. Hicks, 480
U.S. 325 (1987) (holding that mere reasonable suspicion is not sufficient to invoke the plainview doctrine).
Collins, 138 S. Ct. at 1670 (citing Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 11 (2013)).
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The Court was not finished. Near the end of its opinion it stressed:
“[t]he ability to observe inside curtilage from a lawful vantage point is not
the same as the right to enter curtilage without a warrant for the purpose of
conducting a search to obtain information not otherwise accessible.” 176 This
statement implies that so long as the officer did not enter the curtilage absent
a warrant for the purpose of conducting a search to obtain otherwise
unattainable information, the officer’s actions were constitutionally
permissible. This is simply not true. 177 If anything, the lack of a warrant
bolsters the objective unreasonableness of the officer’s actions. A proper
analysis would not consider whether the officer entered the curtilage to
obtain information not otherwise accessible. Instead, the focus would be on
whether the officer’s intrusion into the curtilage related to a lawful purpose
allowing one to enter the curtilage. Here, the officer’s actions were obviously
unrelated to lawfully conducting a knock-and-talk. 178
Notwithstanding these choices of language, the Court objectively
determined the actions of the officer were constitutionally impermissible in
the absence of a warrant. 179 The officer’s actions were objectively
unreasonable. 180 The officer’s subjective purpose for entering the curtilage
was irrelevant. 181 People have an “expectation of privacy in their property.” 182
They assume their property will not be intruded upon or rummaged
through. 183 It must be highlighted that most Fourth Amendment cases
involve a defendant who has in fact committed some illegal action. 184
Nonetheless, this fact must be separated from the analysis. A test of
constitutionally permissible action affects everyone, not just those who
undertook illegal activity.
Here, the officer did not conduct an appropriate knock-and-talk. 185
The officer walked up the driveway and approached the parked, covered

176
177

Collins, 138 S. Ct. at 1675.
See, e.g., Devenpeck, 543 U.S. at 154; Whren, 517 U.S. at 813; Horton, 496 U.S. at 138;

Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 325 (1987).
Collins, 138 S. Ct. at 1668.
Id. at 1671.

178
179
180
181

Id.
Id.

United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 312 n.3 (1987).
Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 403 (2014) (claiming opposition to British officers
rummaging through homes in an unrestrained searches inspired the Revolution itself);
United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 407 (2012) (holding that a physical intrusion of private
property constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment).
See, e.g., Collins, 138 S. Ct. at 1666; Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1 (2013); State v. Chute,
887 N.W.2d 834 (Minn. Ct. App. 2016).
Collins, 138 S. Ct. at 1668.
182
183

184

185

466

MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:2

motorcycle, and not Collins’ front door. 186 As the Court noted, a legitimate
visitor would only walk about halfway up the driveway, turn right, and go up
the steps leading to the front porch. 187 Instead, the officer trekked the
entirety of the driveway. 188 This action constituted an initial Fourth
Amendment violation, as it was a physical intrusion unrelated to the lawful
purpose of conducting a knock-and-talk. After arriving at the top of the
driveway, which abutted the home, the officer removed the tarp covering
the motorcycle and ran its license plate and VIN. 189 The action of removing
the tarp did not relate to conducting a lawful knock-and-talk. 190 Moreover,
the action of running the motorcycle’s license plate and VIN was an
additional, unlawful physical intrusion that did not relate to conducting a
lawful knock-and-talk. 191
Reasonable people expect that their property immediately adjacent to
the home will remain free from intrusion. 192 There was no attempt by the
officer to reach Collins at the front door until the officer had confirmed his
suspicion that the motorcycle was, in fact, stolen. 193 Objectively, the officer’s
actions were unreasonable. It did not matter what the officer’s subjective
purpose was. Even though the officer stated he entered the curtilage “to
investigate further,” 194 the Court’s reasoning is best understood as an implicit
enunciation that the officer’s actions did not relate to a lawful purpose for
entering the curtilage, which would be to conduct a knock-and-talk. If the
Court is committed to disregarding the officer’s true subjective purpose, the
only inconsistency is any reference to an officer’s purpose at all.
It is again beneficial to analyze Justice Alito’s dissent. 195 Ultimately, the
inquiry of constitutionality broadly requires a determination as to the
reasonability of the officer’s actions. 196 Although Justice Alito’s conclusion is
incorrect as to the reasonability of the officer’s actions, he presented a
narrow determination to follow when analyzing the constitutionality of an
officer’s actions. Specifically, Justice Alito immediately stressed: “[t]he
Fourth Amendment prohibits ‘unreasonable’ searches. What the police did
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in this case was entirely reasonable.” 197 Justice Alito’s arguments are best
understood as assertions that the officer’s actions did not constitute an
objectively unreasonable intrusion. 198 If Justice Alito reached this conclusion
here, it is difficult to imagine a factual scenario involving curtilage that Justice
Alito would conclude is ever constitutionally impermissible.
Nowhere in the dissent does Alito reference the officer’s subjective
purpose. Alito does not use language that is arguably subjective or explicitly
consider any subjective evidence. 199 The entire analysis is framed in terms of
intrusiveness, which, as will be shown, is also constitutionally irrelevant.
Specifically, Justice Alito notes the ready mobility of the motorcycle, the fact
that the officer made a “short” walk up the driveway, a lack of damage to
the home or curtilage, and the fact that the officer had probable cause to
believe the motorcycle was stolen and had been involved in the commission
of crimes. 200 Justice Alito argues the Court’s conclusion does not “comport
with the reality of everyday life.” 201 In sum, Justice Alito’s dissent stressed the
Court’s decision was “strikingly unreasonable.” 202 Unlike in Jardines,
however, the evidence relied upon by Justice Alito may relate to
reasonableness generally. However, it only slightly relates to whether the
officer’s actions related to the lawful conducting of a knock-and-talk. The
record shows the officer’s actions obviously did not. 203
It is beneficial to conclude this discussion with thoughts on a
commentator’s understanding of purpose. Professor Nirej Sekhon argues
that all determinations as to an actor’s subjective purpose must be
completed using objective evidence. 204 Sekhon contextualizes this assertion
by stating at its core, determining an actor’s purpose in this way equates to a
“subjective test.” 205 Each of these arguments is faulty, and they do not mesh
with one another.
All determinations as to an actor’s subjective purpose need not be
completed using objective evidence. Perhaps this is true in order to be
constitutionally permissible. However, the former argument highlights
evidentiary and linguistic issues that again cause problems for courts. Very
rarely is there any truly subjective evidence in the context of the Fourth
197
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200
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Amendment. This does not mean an officer’s subjective purpose needs to
be determined using objective evidence. Additionally, courts do not try to
decipher an actor’s subjective purpose. 206 Rather, courts use objective
evidence to determine an apparent purpose. 207 If an actor’s true subjective
purpose needs to be deciphered, which is rarely possible anyway, the only
evidence appropriate to make such a determination is subjective evidence.
As for the latter argument, even if the former argument were true, such a
test would not be subjective. The courts are apathetic as to what the actor’s
true subjective purpose was. 208 Perhaps the test is artificially subjective from
the perspective that a purpose is always inherently subjective. Yet, to say
such a test is “just” subjective glosses over the truly objective considerations
of the courts. 209 Again, these thoughts highlight the confusion that exists.
V. A MISCELLANEOUS CASE THAT HIGHLIGHTS THE LINGUISTIC
DILEMMA
Before discussing why the two-pronged test of the constitutionality of
action within curtilage should be superseded by a test of objective
reasonability that analyzes whether the officer’s actions relate to a lawful
purpose for entering one’s curtilage, it is useful to look at a case that analyzes
purpose outside of the curtilage context. In Devenpeck v. Alford, the
respondent was arrested and charged with violating Washington’s State
Privacy Act after recording conversations he had with two police officers
after being pulled over. 210 At the scene, the respondent accurately protested
his arrest, stating that a Washington Court of Appeals opinion allowed him
to record “roadside conversations with police officers.” 211 Believing the
arrest to be lawful under Washington’s State Privacy Act, one officer
instructed an accompanying officer to take the respondent to jail. 212
As it turns out, the respondent’s actions did not constitute a crime
under Washington’s State Privacy Act. 213 However, probable cause existed
to arrest the respondent for impersonating and obstructing law enforcement
officers. 214 The Washington Court of Appeals held that the crimes of
impersonating and obstructing law enforcement officers were not “closely
206

Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 806 (1996).

207

Id. at 812 (citing United States v. Villamonte–Marquez, 462 U.S. 579, 584 (1983))
Id.
See id.

208
209
210

543 U.S. 146, 149–50 (2004).

211

Id.
Id. at 150.
Id. at 152.
Id.

212
213
214

2020]

THE PURPOSE PARADOX

469

related” to the crime the respondent was arrested for. 215 Additionally, the
Court of Appeals also held it was objectively unreasonable for an officer to
believe it was lawful to arrest the respondent for violating Washington’s
State Privacy Act. 216 Therefore, the arrest was unlawful. At its core, this is a
mistake of law case. The question certified by the Supreme Court was
“whether an arrest is lawful under the Fourth Amendment when the
criminal offense for which there is probable cause to arrest is not ‘closely
related’ to the offense stated by the arresting officer at the time of arrest.” 217
Relying on Whren, the Court stressed the officer’s subjective purpose
for conducting an arrest need not be that the person under arrest took action
that gave rise to probable cause to arrest for the specific criminal offense. 218
For example, imagine an officer sees a person take some action. The officer
believes that action gives rise to probable cause that a specific crime has
been committed. The officer proceeds to arrest that person on the basis that
there is probable cause to believe that specific crime was committed. In
other words, the officer’s purpose for arresting the person is that the person
committed a specific crime. As events unfold, it turns out there actually was
not probable cause to believe that that specific crime was committed. Yet,
there was actually probable cause to arrest the person for a crime distinct
from the crime for which the person was actually arrested. If viewed
objectively, the officer’s actions were justified, that is, if reasonable, the
officer’s actions will not be invalidated. 219
Therefore, the Court held that a rule requiring the offense underlying
an arrest to be “closely related” to the offense for which there is actual
probable cause is inconsistent with the notion that the subjective purpose of
an officer is irrelevant. 220 The Court had no desire to make the subjective
motivation of an officer relevant to the “lawfulness of an arrest.” 221
Justice Scalia provided an interesting and accurate perspective on the
irrelevance of subjective purpose. He argued an officer’s subjective purpose
for making an arrest, “however it is determined (and of course subjective
intent is always determined by objective means), is simply no basis for
invalidating an arrest.” 222 This statement correctly asserts that regardless of
whether or how a subjective purpose can be determined, such
215
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determination is irrelevant. 223 The point that matters is that any true or
apparent subjective purpose is itself irrelevant. 224
Notwithstanding the preceding, although one can argue it is plausible
to determine an apparent purpose using objective evidence, a purpose is
innately subjective and cannot truly be determined objectively. Objective
evidence can be evaluated as to the reasonability of an officer’s action, but
it cannot be evaluated to definitively determine why someone actually acted.
While Justice Scalia’s statement is correct from the perspective that the
subjective intent of an actor is irrelevant, it also highlights the confusion and
linguistic difficulties afflicting the courts handling these cases. 225
VI. THE TWO-PRONG TEST SHOULD BE ABOLISHED
In Horton v. California, the Supreme Court proclaimed that:
“evenhanded law enforcement is best achieved by the application of
objective standards of conduct, rather than standards that depend upon the
subjective state of mind of the officer.” 226 While the sole reliance on
objective standards does not always lead to “evenhanded law enforcement,”
to the contrary, the opposite is often true—objective standards are
exceedingly more manageable than subjective ones. 227 The degree of
objective evidence available will always dwarf the subjective evidence
available, if any of the latter even exists. 228
Therefore, if the Court is steadfast in its reliance on precedent, that is,
the subjective motivations of an actor are irrelevant, all references to an
individual’s purpose should cease. This is in light of the fact that the Court’s
current analysis of purpose has the tendency to cause great confusion. The
Jardines two-prong test, 229 and particularly the purpose prong, should be
abolished in favor of an objective test of reasonability that analyzes whether
the officer’s intrusion within the curtilage is related to a lawful purpose and
not the officer’s subjective purpose for entering the curtilage. In this context,
a lawful purpose for entering one’s curtilage would be to conduct a
permissible knock-and-talk. This test focuses heavily on the officer’s
223
224
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location within the curtilage. If the intrusion is unrelated to a lawful purpose
for entering the curtilage, such action is unconstitutional regardless of why
the officer actually went where they did within the curtilage. This test, of
course, presumes no other exigencies are present.
This proposed test derives its logic from Arizona v. Hicks, in which
Justice Scalia focused on why officers were justified in entering an apartment
in relation to what one officer did after entering the apartment. 230 The facts
of Hicks deserve attention. On April 18, 1984, a bullet was fired through
the floor of respondent's apartment, striking and injuring a man in the
apartment below. 231 Police officers arrived and entered respondent's
apartment to search for the shooter, other victims, and weapons. 232 Exigent
circumstances and the community caretaker function justified the officer’s
initial intrusion into the apartment. 233 During the course of this search one
officer discovered readily apparent expensive stereo equipment, which
seemed out of place in the dilapidated dwelling. 234 Since the officer had an
inkling the equipment was stolen, he proceeded to read the equipment’s
serial numbers and manipulating pieces, including lifting a turntable to view
its underside. 235 The officer reported the turntable’s serial number to his
headquarters and was informed the turntable had been stolen. 236 The officer
immediately seized the turntable. 237
Justice Scalia focused on the manipulation of the equipment—
specifically lifting the turntable to view its underside—as opposed to the
recording of the equipment’s serial numbers. 238 Such manipulation
constituted a search separate from the search for the shooter, weapons, and
any injured persons, which was “the lawful objective” of the officer’s entry
into the apartment. 239 Taking action distinct from the lawful “objectives of
the authorized intrusion . . . did produce a new invasion of respondent’s
privacy unjustified by the exigent circumstance that validated the entry.” 240
The officer lacked probable cause to believe the equipment was stolen. 241 In
the absence of probable cause, Justice Scalia was unwilling to extend to
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officers the power to search and seize an object during a search unrelated
to the lawful purpose that justified the initial entry. 242
Critically, the level of intrusiveness is not a factor to be considered in
the analysis. In the Court’s dissenting opinion, Justices Rehnquist,
O’Connor, and Powell were dismayed at Justice Scalia’s conclusion,
focusing heavily on the fact that the officer’s conduct was not intrusive. 243
Specifically, the dissent was dissatisfied by the distinction between simply
reading a serial number on an object and moving that same object a few
inches in order to read its serial number. 244 Such a distinction arguably
“trivializes the Fourth Amendment.” 245 Ultimately, if reasonable suspicion
exists that an object in plain-view is evidence of a crime, the dissent believes
a cursory inspection of such items—even one that involves moving those
items—is a constitutionally permissible way of verifying such suspicion. 246
Justice Scalia stressed that a cursory inspection can never involve moving
items; a visual inspection is all that is justified. 247 A “search is a search, even
if it happens to disclose nothing but the bottom of a turntable.” 248
The dissent’s support of an intrusiveness inquiry is problematic.
Broadly, the test of intrusiveness creates the exceptional likelihood that
court decisions will frequently be inconsistent. There is no way to
adequately define what constitutes “too intrusive” in light of the vast array of
factual scenarios. 249 For example, some people, including Justice Alito,
believe deviating a few feet while walking up a driveway is completely
nonintrusive; others disagree. 250 Regardless of the intrusiveness of such
deviation, that deviation is obviously unrelated to conducting a lawful knockand-talk. That is all that matters.
From a policy perspective, a warrant should be required when
conducting searches in and around the home. If the officer had probable
cause to believe stolen equipment was within the apartment, he would have
needed probable cause to obtain a warrant to search and seize that
equipment prior to entering the apartment. 251 The home is sacred and
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deserves the most stringent protection. 252 Justice Scalia’s conclusions in
Hicks were beautifully simple and effectively translatable to the curtilage
context. 253 A test of whether an officer’s intrusion relates to a lawful purpose
for entering the curtilage is an efficient way of determining the ultimate
question: whether the officer’s actions exceeded the scope of the implied
license to conduct a knock-and-talk and as a result, were unreasonable. This
test is more manageable because it mitigates linguistic difficulties.
The final task of this article is to attempt to define when an officer’s
intrusion fails to relate to a lawful purpose for entering one’s curtilage and,
as a result, when an officer’s action exceeds the scope of the implied license.
Any such definition, if employed, would require a rigorous case-by-case
analysis of the factual circumstances. As mentioned, Florida v. Jardines
defined the implicit license in this context as permitting all visitors to
approach a home, knock, wait momentarily for an answer, and in the
absence of an invitation to remain within the curtilage longer, to then leave. 254
The “social norms” that invite a visitor to approach the front door of one’s
home does not invite that same visitor to conduct a search upon arrival. 255
As previously argued, the actions of the officer’s in Jardines, Chute,
and Collins were clearly unrelated to the lawful purpose of conducting a
permissible knock-and-talk. 256 They all involved officers who either ventured
to an impermissible location within the curtilage, stayed an impermissible
amount of time within the curtilage, employed impermissible devices or
articles within the curtilage, or some combination of the three. Additionally,
the time of day an officer enters the curtilage should be given considerable
weight. The preceding pertinent facts comprise a non-exclusive list of
relevant considerations. Depending on the context, other critical objective
evidence may be available. In sum, a totality of the circumstances approach
should be employed when determining whether the officer’s intrusion
related to a lawful purpose for entering one’s curtilage and as a result,
whether an officer’s action exceeded the scope of the implied license.
First, borrowing language from United States v. Shuck, a 2013 case
arising out of the Tenth Circuit, a state agent may only approach a home
using the “normal route of access” used by anyone visiting the home. 257
Similarly, a visitor approaching the home should initially be required to
252
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approach the home’s front door in a linear fashion, as opposed to seeking
out a homeowner in the backyard. 258 Only in rare instances should a state
agent or any visitor be allowed to seek out the homeowner in another
location within the curtilage. 259 The normal route of access will, however,
necessarily vary depending on the factual context. Critically, this route of
access does not condone deviations in course. For example, in Jardines the
officer allowed his canine to move across the breadth of the homeowner’s
porch, as opposed to simply approaching the front door in a linear path and
remaining stationary in that location until being greeted by the
homeowner. 260 If the canine had refrained from transcending the breadth of
the porch, and instead simply alerted upon reaching the front door, as
noted, the result in Jardines may have been different.
Additionally, in Collins v. Virginia, the officer initially failed to
approach the home’s front door at all. Only after deviating substantially
from the path taken by a normal visitor did the officer attempt to reach the
homeowner at the front door. 261 Professor Wayne R. LaFave argues “[a]ny
substantial and unreasonable departure from the area where the public is
impliedly invited exceeds the scope of the implied invitation.” 262 In contrast
to LaFave’s argument that only substantial deviations are unreasonable, I,
channeling Justice Scalia, argue any deviation unrelated to the lawful
purpose of conducting a knock-and-talk is unreasonable and constitutionally
impermissible. LaFave’s argument is dangerous from the perspective that it
would minimize the protections afforded to homeowners under the Fourth
Amendment. An officer should not have to deviate substantially to exceed
the scope of the implied license. There is also a myriad of ways to interpret
the meaning of a “substantial and unreasonable departure.” Such a test
would increase the likelihood of inconsistent holdings. Ultimately, the
license is to conduct a knock-and-talk; not to look around within the
curtilage. In sum, the determination as to whether the state agent
approached the home’s front door using the normal route of access, without
deviations, is persuasive as to whether the state agent’s intrusion within the
curtilage related to a lawful purpose allowing the state agent to intrude upon
the curtilage.
Second, if the officer desires to conduct a knock-and-talk, the knock
must be completed “promptly.” 263 Once the knock is complete, the officer
258
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may only wait “briefly” for the homeowner to respond. 264 What these
adverbs actually mean will be the subject of substantial argument depending
on the circumstances. What is then required is an extremely narrow
interpretation of these terms that leaves officers with little margin for error.
The officer may not act lackadaisically. Rather, the officer must immediately
and without delay knock on the homeowner’s door. Within a matter of
moments, the officer will be aware of whether or not he will actually be
greeted by the homeowner. If the homeowner does not greet the officer or
give a sign that a greeting is pending, the officer must leave. Even the slightest
action that extends the time it takes to conduct a permissible knock-and-talk
should be sharply circumscribed. The justifications allowing ingress to the
home do not comport with officer actions that attempt to expand the
traditional invitation to approach the home. Any delay in conducting a
permissible knock-and-talk is persuasive evidence that the officer’s intrusion
was unrelated to a lawful purpose for intruding within one’s curtilage.
Third, an officer may not employ complementary devices or objects
during a prospective knock-and-talk. The accompaniment of a detection
dog is a clear example of what an officer should not be able to do while
conducting a knock-and-talk. Such accompaniment, whether it concerns a
detection dog, a metal detector, or a thermal scanner, inter alia, pertains to
whether the officer’s intrusion within the curtilage relates to the purpose of
conducting a lawful knock-and-talk. Bringing such devices or objects is
persuasive evidence that the officer’s intrusion is unrelated to conducting a
lawful knock-and-talk.
In contrast to my position as to the relevance of what accompanies the
officer, Justice Scalia argues “[i]t is not the dog that is the problem, but the
behavior that here involved use of the dog.” 265 The behavior Justice Scalia is
referring to is the officer’s “snooping about” on Jardines’ front porch. 266
There is not a true distinction between the dog itself and the behavior that
“involved use of the dog.” 267 Regardless, Justice Scalia is correct in that the
critical question is not what the officer’s purpose was, but whether the
officer’s actions, including being accompanied by a device or object,
constituted an intrusion unrelated to the lawful purpose that justifies a
knock-and-talk. Therefore, the officer’s purpose is irrelevant. For example,
in Chute, if the officer stated his purpose was to “snoop” about but did not
deviate from the path to the house, the officer’s conduct would not have
been unreasonable. 268
264
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Finally, although it is difficult to precisely define the appropriate times
an officer may approach a home, due in large part to varying daylight hours
and shifting seasons, the officer may never approach the home to conduct
a knock-and-talk after sunset or before sunrise. Such intrusions are not
desirable, customary, nor respectful. Personal privacy and freedom of
repose in one’s dwelling trumps an officer’s desire to ferret out potential
criminal activity, unless a rare exigency exists. 269 Although such late night or
early morning intrusions are persuasive evidence that the officer’s intrusion
is unrelated to the purpose of conducting a knock-and-talk, there are safety
concerns as well. 270 Such late night and early morning intrusions could cause
the homeowner to panic. In comparison to knock-and-talks conducted in
the daylight, “searches under the cover of darkness create a greater risk of
armed response—with potentially tragic results—from fearful residents who
may mistake the police officers for criminal intruders.” 271 In sum, the
preceding is a non-exclusive list of considerations that courts should make
when determining whether an officer’s actions related to the lawful purpose
of conducting a knock-and-talk, and as a result, were constitutional.
VII. CONCLUSION
The purpose of this article is two-fold. The first was to show that
although courts often struggle linguistically in their discussions of purpose,
these courts are not inconsistent when they proclaim the subjective intent of
an officer is in fact irrelevant to the constitutionality of an officer’s actions.
Particularly in the context of searches within curtilage and permissible
knock-and-talks, the courts’ language causes confusion as to whether the
subjective motivations of an officer truly are irrelevant. Notwithstanding
these linguistic difficulties, courts rely solely on objective evidence to
determine an officer’s ostensible purpose. In all three of the highlighted
cases, courts determined the officer’s actions were objectively unreasonable.
Although it was not explicitly stated, such determinations were due to the
fact that the officers exceeded the scope of their implied license to knockand-talk by taking action unrelated to conducting a lawful knock-and-talk.
Second, this article implores the U.S. Supreme Court to do away
with the two-prong test concerning the constitutionality of searches within
one’s curtilage as enunciated in Jardines. All references to an officer’s
purpose cease in the hope that existing confusion is mitigated. As a
substitute for the two-prong test, the Court should adopt a test that analyzes
whether an officer’s actions are related to the lawful purpose that allows the
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officer to legally enter one’s curtilage. This framework would rely on a nonexclusive list of objective considerations which include: (1) the officer’s
location within the curtilage; (2) the amount of time the officer remained
within the curtilage; (3) whether the officer entered the curtilage alone or
was accompanied by another device or article; (4) and the time of day the
officer entered the curtilage. However, no one fact should be dispositive.
The totality of the circumstances is key. Such a test would mitigate existing
confusion and uncertainty. Ultimately, my proposal entails a manageable
test that allow courts to answer the critical question: whether the officer’s
actions were objectively reasonable.
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